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ABSTRACT—Presidential recess appointments have strained relations
between Congress and the Executive Branch since the Administration of
George Washington. But in 2007, Congress began using a procedure to
prevent such appointments from happening at all. By sending one member
to stand in front of an empty chamber while the rest of the Senate took
vacation, Congress claimed it was in “pro forma” session, not at recess, and
that the President could therefore not make recess appointments. While
Presidents Bush and Obama acquiesced to this tactic and declined to make
appointments during such pro forma sessions, Obama changed course in
early 2012. In so doing, this Comment argues, Obama’s appointments were
on solid constitutional footing. Not only did the pro forma sessions
deactivate an enumerated power of the President, but they did so by
explicitly involving the House of Representatives in the appointments
process, an event the Framers specifically sought to guard against. Indeed,
by putting an end to recesses (and thus recess appointments), Congress
defied a procedural assumption of the Framers written into the Constitution
and practiced by legislatures for millennia. From a policy standpoint,
blocking presidential appointments perpetuated a harmful glut of unfilled
offices, but was in some cases self-defeating. The President, through the
Appointments Act, has the power to fill certain positions with acting heads
who carry out his policy goals.
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INTRODUCTION
On the morning of January 23, 2012, just after most senators were
returning from a month-long vacation away from Washington, Senator
Chuck Grassley, a straight-talking seventy-eight-year-old farmer from
Iowa, took the floor of the Senate with a blistering attack. The message:
during the Senate’s holiday recess, President Barack Obama had
orchestrated a power grab unprecedented in the annals of Congress.1 In
making four recess appointments to executive branch positions earlier that
month, Obama had become, Grassley said, nothing less than a king.2 He had
shed constitutional limits on his powers, becoming the reviled monarch that
the Constitution sought to replace.3
These were serious charges, to be sure, but Grassley was not alone.
Nearly the entire Republican cohort in the Senate vilified the President’s
decision to “arrogantly cast[] aside our Constitution,” an action straight out

1

158 CONG. REC. S24 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2012).
Id. at S25.
3
Id. Grassley went on to promise that the Office of Legal Counsel attorney who had written a
memo defending the recess appointments would never again receive Senate confirmation; his hometown
paper described the speech as an “explo[sion] [of] outrage.” Editorial, Grassley Personal Attack Went
Too Far, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 31, 2012, at 6A.
2
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of “the monarchies of Western Europe.”4 January 4, 2012, the day of the
appointments, was a national disaster—“a day that will live on in infamy.”5
Thirty-nine senators signed an open letter promising to serve as amici
curiae to a pending legal claim against the appointments.6 And at a hearing
with one of Obama’s recess picks, one senator actually stayed home in
protest,7 while others assured the appointee that nothing he did in office
would ever be upheld.8
Angry senators have been a time-honored accompaniment to most
presidents’ recess appointments, from George Washington to Theodore
Roosevelt to George W. Bush. Presidents have used the power, set forth
explicitly in Article II,9 to appoint federal officers ranging from army
officers10 to Justices of the Supreme Court11 while the Senate is on vacation.
Yet the anger that surrounded Obama’s own recess appointments in 2012
reached a new level for one reason: this time, the Senate claimed it had
never actually been at recess.
Instead, during the chamber’s latest break, one senator briefly stood
guard over the chamber once every three days—one time for forty-one
seconds,12 another for twenty-nine seconds.13 In parliamentary terms, these
legislators were keeping the Senate in “pro forma” session, thus preventing
4

Seung Min Kim, Republicans Join Challenge of Recess Appointments, POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2012,
1:37 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/72422.html (quoting Sen. John Cornyn).
5
Felicia Sonmez, Mike Lee on Obama Recess Appointments: A ‘Day of Infamy,’ WASH. POST (Feb.
1, 2012, 3:02 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/mike-lee-on-obama-recessappointments-a-day-of-infamy/2012/02/01/gIQAxozJiQ_blog.html (quoting Sen. Mike Lee).
6
Open Letter from Thirty-Nine Members of the U.S. Senate (Feb. 3, 2012), available at http://
images.politico.com/global/2012/02/senate_gop_amicus_intent_letter_3_feb_12.pdf.
7
See Peter Schroeder, Republican Lawmakers Begin Pushback Against Obama Recess
Appointments, THE HILL (Jan. 29, 2012, 8:16 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/1007-other/
207277-republican-lawmakers-begin-pushback-against-obama-recess-appointments(quoting Sen.
Roger Wicker: “I will not provide the administration with the appearance of legitimacy in this action,
and I will therefore not be in attendance at next Tuesday’s hearing.”).
8
Jim Puzzanghera, GOP: Cordray’s Appointment Invalid, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, at B2
(statement of Sen. Mike Johanns to Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Director Richard Cordray).
9
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their
next Session.”).
10
See Special Session Is Merged Into Regular, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1903, at 1 [hereinafter Special
Session] (detailing President Theodore Roosevelt’s recess appointment of 168 army officers during
momentary recess of Congress).
11
See Henry B. Hogue, The Law: Recess Appointments to Article III Courts, 34 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 656, 660–61 (2004) (describing recess appointments of twelve Supreme Court Justices). The
practice of recess-appointing Supreme Court Justices was not limited to early America; Chief Justice
Earl Warren and Justices William Brennan and Potter Stewart received their initial appointments from
President Eisenhower during Senate recesses. See Diana Gribbon Motz, The Constitutionality and
Advisability of Recess Appointments of Article III Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1677–78 (2011).
12
158 CONG. REC. S1 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2012).
13
Id. at S3 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2012).
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the President from making any recess appointments whatsoever.14 While
both George W. Bush and Obama had previously acquiesced to this tactic,15
the Obama Administration in 2012 determined that the Senate was, in fact,
bluffing.16 Obama’s four appointments included the director of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a new agency, as well as
three members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which
would not otherwise have been able to issue binding decisions.17
Though it first appeared as a means of blocking appointments in 2007,
the pro forma session—or, as at least one member of Congress called it
publicly, the “kill switch”18—quickly became relied upon by both parties as
a weapon against disfavored potential recess appointees.19 Yet Obama’s
appointments in early 2012 changed that, and opponents of the move in
legal circles have charged the President with abusing the separation of
powers by deciding for himself whether the Senate was at recess.20 These
opponents claim that parties who seek to challenge decisions of the
agencies headed by recess appointees will likely find success in court.21 The
reality, however, may not play out so cleanly.
14

Id. at S24 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2012) (statement of Sen. Grassley: “[T]he Senate has been holding
sessions every 3 days. It did so precisely to prevent the President from making recess appointments.”).
15
See Charlie Savage, Obama Tempts Fight over Recess Appointments, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS (Jan.
4, 2012, 4:34 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/obama-tempts-fight-over-recessappointments (positing that the 2012 appointments were “an unprecedented legal step that brought into
sharper focus a recent bipartisan struggle over presidential power”).
16
See Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic
Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. (Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Lawfulness of Recess Appointments],
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf.
17
Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer Chief, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1 (late edition). For the Supreme Court’s decision that the NLRB must have
three members to issue decisions, see New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2644 (2010).
18
See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Jeff Landry, Landry Presides Over House, Blocks Recess
Appointments (July 1, 2011), available at http://landry.house.gov/press-release/landry-presides-overhouse-blocks-recess-appointments (describing the “kill switch” as “a provision the Founding Fathers
gave the House to utilize when the Senate’s advice and consent is being circumvented by a hostile
Administration”).
19
See Steven G. Bradbury & John P. Elwood, Recess Is Canceled: President Obama Should Call
the Senate’s Bluff, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2010, at A19 (noting that pro forma sessions “will inevitably
become the standard operating procedure, and the recess appointment power could become a virtual
dead letter”).
20
See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The Constitution Is Clear on Recess Appointments, RICOCHET (Jan. 4,
2012, 3:52 PM), http://ricochet.com/main-feed/The-Constitution-Is-Clear-On-Recess-Appointments.
21
See, e.g., John Yoo, Richard Cordray & the Use and Abuse of Executive Power, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE CORNER (Jan. 5, 2012, 10:59 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/287264/richardcordray-use-and-abuse-executive-power-john-yoo. On the opposite end of the spectrum, proponents of
the appointments have predicted their defense in court will be a “slam-dunk.” See, e.g., Laurence H.
Tribe, Op-Ed., Games and Gimmicks in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, at A25. Others have
opined that courts could go “either way.” See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, Obama’s Recess Appointments
Might Not Hold Up in Court, THE HILL (Jan. 18, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/
administration/204731-recess-appointments-might-not-hold- (quoting Professor Charles Fried).
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The recess appointments of 2012 may have occurred while the Senate
had not formally declared a recess. But as this Comment will argue, they
were nonetheless constitutional—and also prudent. As employed by the
President, the recess appointments interrupted an unconstitutional
congressional practice that appeared regularly since 2007. During that time,
both the Senate and later the House employed the pro forma session in a
manner that did not comport with the Framers’ intent or with modern policy
realities that infuse the appointments process. Not only did the sessions
nullify an enumerated power of the Executive, but they also involved the
House in the appointments process, which is strictly the province of the
President and Senate. Further, pro forma sessions essentially eliminated the
recess, violating an assumption of the Framers who wrote recesses into the
Constitution.
Part I of this Comment will explore the historical antecedents of the
recess of the American Congress and of the recess appointment power, as
well as examine the evolution of both from procedural convenience to
strategic weapon. In Part II, this Comment will examine arguments for and
against the constitutionality of President Obama’s 2012 recess
appointments, concluding that they were constitutionally valid. Part III will
go further to examine whether the pro forma sessions intended to block
those appointments were constitutional in their own right, concluding they
were not. And in Part IV, this Comment will analyze policy implications of
the pro forma session and of the President’s recess appointments, observing
both the problem of crucial federal offices remaining unfilled and the
negligible strategic effect that obstructionist pro forma sessions actually
possess.
These arguments seek to clarify a debate that has already sparked a
vigorous back-and-forth in the legal community. But clarity on this question
is also critical for its legal resolution. That this year’s recess appointments
will be challenged is not in question; they already have been. In September
2012, forty-two Republican senators made good on their promise to fight
the appointments in court, filing an amicus brief in a canning company’s
suit challenging the constitutionality of Obama’s recess appointments to the
NLRB.22 Three months earlier, a Texas bank sued the CFPB itself,
challenging the agency’s “unconstitutional formation and operation” due in
part to Obama’s “refusing to secure the Senate’s advice and consent” in
recess appointing the CFPB’s director.23 And in Washington, a district judge
22

See Brief for Amici Curiae Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell and 41 Other Members
of the United States Senate in Support of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Noel Canning, Noel Canning v.
NLRB, Nos. 12-1115, 12-1153 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 2012). Speaker of the House John Boehner filed an
amicus brief of his own as well. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Speaker of the United States House of
Representatives, John Boehner, in Support of Petitioner, Noel Canning v. NLRB, Nos. 12-1115, 121153 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 2012).
23
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3–4, State Natl’l Bank of Big Spring v.
Geithner, No. 12-cv-01032, 2012 WL 2365284 (D.D.C. June 21, 2012).
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in early 2012 dismissed a similar argument about the NLRB’s board
members because the NLRB decision in question occurred “well before the
recess appointments were announced.”24
Given the status quo result of the November 2012 election—with
President Obama returned to office, and the House and Senate retaining the
same majorities—further skirmishes are possible. Each action of the CFPB
under Richard Cordray and the NLRB with its new membership is subject
to challenge by those affected. And as it was pointed out on the day of
Obama’s reelection, Cordray’s recess appointment expires in 2013,
portending another fight over an appointment for his position.25 A workable
defense of the appointments on the merits will assist in deciding inevitable
criticisms of the appointments in the coming years.
I.

THE RECESS AND THE RECESS APPOINTMENT

A. Historical Antecedents
The idea of legislative recess did not originate with the United States
Congress. The Roman Senate typically took a recess starting in late spring,
known as the senatus discessus. Only on these breaks, which were
discussed by Cicero, “could a senator enjoy a connected holiday of any
length.”26 While the houses of the English Parliament have always
adjourned frequently, the decision to adjourn was sometimes not by choice,
as the King often prorogued (or temporarily halted) parliamentary
proceedings.27 Four hundred years ago, the houses of Parliament sought
permission from the King to take their traditional recesses, and permission
was not always given.28 But the practice of voluntary holiday breaks in
24

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, Civ. Action No. 11-1629 (ABJ), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128436,
at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2012). The decision has been appealed. Steve L. Hernández, Employer
Associations Appeal District Court NLRB Posting Decision, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2b1ab9f9-cc5c-44d9-b1a0-1fde7034899a.
25
See Kevin Wack, What Obama’s Victory Means for Banks, AM. BANKER (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:36
PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_215/what-obama-s-victory-means-for-banks-105418
9-1.html?zkPrintable=true. As this Comment went to press, the first appellate arguments over the recess
appointments were being held. In the Seventh Circuit, Judge Ann Claire Williams appeared skeptical of
the Senate’s contention that it was not at recess. “Isn’t the Senate having its cake and eating it too?” she
asked. Andrew Harris, Obama Recess Appointments Face First Appeals Court Test, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
30, 2012, 2:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-30/obama-recess-appointments-facefirst-appeals-court-test.html.
26
JOHN H. D’ARMS, ROMANS ON THE BAY OF NAPLES: A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL STUDY OF THE
VILLAS AND THEIR OWNERS FROM 150 B.C. TO A.D. 400, at 48–49 (1970).
27
2 JOSEF REDLICH, THE PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 65–67 (A. Earnest Steinthal
trans., 1903).
28
On April 10, 1628, for example, the House of Commons asked King Charles I, “with his gracious
Favour,” to grant an Easter recess; later that day, the King’s secretary reported that “his Majesty, for
many weighty Reasons, desireth there may be no Recess.” 1 H.C. JOUR. 881 (Apr. 10, 1628), available
at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=3704&strquery=recess.
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Parliament was well established before the American Revolution. In 1770,
for example, the House of Lords voted to adjourn on December 21, and
returned to London in time to hold sessions during the last few days of
January the following year.29
In America, the Continental Congress broke frequently as it moved
around the country during the lead-in to the Revolutionary War, staying
ahead of potential danger surrounding its activities.30 The body took few
long recesses, perhaps owing to the urgency of its task managing the new
country and its war, but after the completion of hostilities, it did manage to
take a holiday vacation.31 After 1789, recesses were more frequent and
lasted much longer.32 The state legislatures took generous breaks as well. In
December 1778, its work complete for the year, the Virginia House of
Delegates took a recess of over four months; members were instructed to
meet with their constituents during the break and gain their approval for a
pay raise.33 In Colonial Era Massachusetts, the House of Representatives
held three sessions each year, with breaks of a few months between each.34
Just as Congress did not come up with the idea of taking pronounced
legislative breaks, it also did not originate the practice of tapping an actor to
execute its duties while members are away. In England, the House of
Commons was permitted to grant large sums for the King’s use during an
upcoming recess if the House feared that war would break out at that time.35
Likewise, as Blackstone noted, if the House of Lords was away at recess
and could not perform its duty as a supreme court of appeal, a tribunal of
nobles, appointed with every new Parliament, was empowered to serve in
its place.36 Finally, if Parliament was in recess “upwards of twenty days”
when a vacancy occurred among its members, the Speaker of the House of

29

33 H.L. JOUR. 35–37 (Dec. 21, 1770).
8 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 754–55 (Worthington Chauncey
Ford ed., 1907) (entry for Sept. 18, 1777, referring to a letter from a Revolutionary Army colonel that
“intimated the necessity of Congress removing immediately from Philadelphia”; the body met again
nine days later in Lancaster, Pennsylvania).
31
27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 710 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1928)
(adjourning on Dec. 24, 1784, for eighteen days); 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–
1789, at 1 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933) (resuming business on Jan. 11, 1785).
32
See infra Part I.B.
33
See 1778 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 123,
129 (Richmond, Thomas W. White 1827).
34
See, e.g., JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1721–1722
(1922); JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 1764–1765 (1971).
35
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 209 n.32 (Thomas M.
Cooley ed., Chi., Callaghan & Cockcroft 1871) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE (Cooley ed.)].
36
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *56–57. The tribunal comprised one prelate, two
earls, and two barons. Id. at *57.
30
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Commons was directed by statute to make arrangements for a special
election.37
The theme continued in the Colonies. When members of the
Continental Congress traveled during the Revolutionary War, they assigned
General George Washington “full power” to execute combat operations.38
Similarly, the Articles of Confederation made provisions for what was to
occur when Congress was at recess and could not perform its duties. The
Articles called for a “Committee of the States,”39 which could, during a
recess, execute “such of the powers of Congress as the United States in
Congress assembled, by the consent of nine States, shall from time to time
think expedient to vest them with.”40 The committee was the brainchild of
Thomas Jefferson, who saw the need for a body “during vacations of
Congress” that could “superintend the executive business.”41 Yet Jefferson
watched the committee crumble; he wrote in his autobiography that its
members “quarrelled very soon, split into two parties, abandoned their post,
and left the government without any visible head, until the next meeting in
Congress.”42 Still, the outcome was not all bad; it helped convince Jefferson
that a unitary executive, or a “single Arbiter,” was necessary for effective
government.43
B. The Recess Appointment in History
1. Founding Principles.—Despite their antecedents in British and
American history, recess appointments received little mention during the
Founding Era. After the regular Appointments Clause44 was adopted during
the Convention of 1787, an action that engendered some debate,45 a North
Carolinian named Richard Dobbs Spaight made a motion to adopt the
37

1 BLACKSTONE (Cooley ed.), supra note 35, at 115 n.40. The Speaker could also issue a writ for a
new election during a recess of any fellow member who had been declared bankrupt. Id. at 116 n.41.
38
6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 30, at 1027 (1906) (declaration of Dec.
12, 1776).
39
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 5 (“The United States in Congress
assembled shall have authority to appoint a committee, to sit in the recess of Congress . . . .”).
40
Id. art. X.
41
THOMAS JEFFERSON, The Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 7, 53–54 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 2004).
42
Id. at 54.
43
Id.
44
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . . .”).
45
See JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 680–81 (photo. reprint 2003)
(E.H. Scott ed., Chi., Scott, Foresman & Co. spec. ed. 1898) (debate of Sept. 7, 1787). George Wilson,
for example, wanted to exclude the legislature altogether from the appointments process; Charles
Pinckney argued that the Senate should be involved only in appointing ambassadors, in which the
President should have no say at all. Id.
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language of the Recess Appointments Clause as it stands today.46 The
language was accepted unanimously and apparently without debate.47 The
Clause’s language closely followed that of the North Carolina constitution,48
and the reasoning for accepting it was not discussed. One explanation,
provided by Justice Story, was that the Framers’ decision to allow recess
appointments was “so obvious that it can require no elucidation,” because
without them, “the Senate should be perpetually in session, in order to
provide for the appointment of officers.”49 That option “would have been at
once burdensome to the Senate and expensive to the public,” and so recess
appointments were permitted in the pursuit of “convenience, promptitude of
action, and general security.”50
Justice Story’s point makes sense, because in the beginning, the recess
of the Senate was long—sometimes longer than the actual session itself.
Even before the Senate first convened, the Framers were likely aware of the
hardship of travel to Washington from most states. Therefore, as Hamilton
observed, “it would have been improper to oblige this body to be
continually in session for the appointment of officers.”51 While the Senate’s
first recess, in 1789, was just over three months,52 subsequent recesses in
the next several sessions of Congress ranged from four months53 to nine.54
In fact, prior to the twentieth century, the Senate averaged fewer than
six months of active duty each year.55 The prospect of leaving open vital
executive offices, such as that of Secretary of War, was considered
potentially dangerous, just as reconvening the Senate whenever an
appointment was necessary would be costly.56 During all other times, the
President could “appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States”
only with the “Advice and Consent of the Senate.”57 Thus, even though
46

Id. at 681–82.
Id.
48
Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical
Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758, 1770–72 & n.71 (1984).
49
2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1557, at 380
(photo. reprint 1994) (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Bos., Little, Brown, & Co. 5th ed. 1891).
50
Id.
51
THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
52
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 94 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
53
Id. at 1036 (1790) (noting adjournment of Congress from August to December).
54
3 ANNALS OF CONG. 668 (1793) (noting adjournment sine die on March 4, 1793); 4 ANNALS OF
CONG. 9 (1793) (noting commencement of new session of Senate on Dec. 2, 1793).
55
HENRY B. HOGUE & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33310, RECESS
APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, JANUARY 20, 2001–OCTOBER 31, 2008, at 5
(2008).
56
See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 1487, 1498–99 (2005).
57
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
47
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practically nothing was said when the Convention adopted the Recess
Appointments Clause, evidence suggests that it was intended to allow the
President to act unilaterally on appointments when the Senate was unable to
advise and consent.
This intention was tested immediately, as George Washington made
the first recess appointments during the three-month break between the first
and second sessions of Congress.58 Certain officers that President
Washington had nominated (and that the Senate had confirmed) declined to
serve.59 When the Senate returned, Washington wrote its members a polite
letter informing them that, “agreeably to the Constitution,” he had
appointed four individuals to fill those spots during the recess: three district
judges, and also a replacement for John Marshall, who had turned down the
job of U.S. Attorney for Virginia.60 Washington’s successors continued the
practice. John Adams, for example, made 21 recess appointments between
the Fifth and Sixth Congresses.61 Just over 2 years later, Thomas Jefferson
managed to appoint 120 officers during a single Senate recess, including 30
judges in the newly created courts for the District of Columbia and
replacements for others who had died, resigned, declined, or been
promoted.62
Not all of these appointments were without controversy. President
Washington was the first to find that failure to involve the Senate in the
appointment of a major government officer comes with drawbacks. During
a recess in 1795, Washington appointed John Rutledge to be Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court.63 Yet in a rare rebuff to a president of “transcendent
status,”64 the Senate refused to confirm Rutledge during its next session,
requiring him to leave office.65 The reason, it seemed, was political, as
Rutledge had made a speech against the Jay Treaty with the British.66 The
conflict was a portent, albeit a small one, of the prolonged battle over recess
appointments to come.
2. Modern Warfare.—The modern conception of the recess
appointment as an alternative to advice and consent may have originated
with Theodore Roosevelt.67 In December 1903, Roosevelt needed a way to
58

See JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 38 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1820)
(proceedings of Feb. 9, 1790).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 325–26 (proceedings of Dec. 5, 1799).
62
Id. at 400–04 (proceedings of Jan. 6, 1802).
63
Curtis, supra note 48, at 1775–76.
64
JOSEPH J. ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY: GEORGE WASHINGTON 147 (2004).
65
Motz, supra note 11, at 1671.
66
Id.
67
The Senate does, however, have a history of rejecting recipients of presidential recess
appointments who are then nominated for confirmation through normal means. See generally Louis C.
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reappoint Dr. William D. Crum, an African-American, as Collector of
Customs in Charleston, South Carolina.68 Roosevelt and his Secretary of
War, Elihu Root, did not want to face the wrath of Southern Democrats who
opposed Crum’s tenure—particularly South Carolina Senator Benjamin R.
“Pitchfork Ben” Tillman.69 So Roosevelt and Root decided upon a recess
appointment as the way to keep Crum in office.70 There was only one
problem: the Senate planned to start its new session immediately after the
end of the previous one.71 Ingeniously, Roosevelt announced that his recess
appointment of Crum, along with 167 other officers, would occur during the
split second between the two Senate sessions—an infinitesimal period that
Root and Roosevelt termed a “constructive” recess.”72
The Senate was not happy.73 In 1905, the Judiciary Committee issued a
report arguing that “[t]here was no ‘recess’ within the letter or spirit of the
Constitution, and therefore there was no right to issue commissions . . . .
The theory of ‘constructive recess’ constitutes a heavy draft upon the
imagination.”74 It should be noted that the President’s “constructive” recess
appointments nonetheless stood, despite the controversy.75
Modern presidents have continued to appoint officers of the federal
government during congressional recesses for reasons more like

James, Senatorial Rejections of Presidential Nominations to the Cabinet: A Study in Constitutional
Custom, 3 ARIZ. L. REV. 232 (1961) (outlining such senatorial rejections).
68
EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 198, 301 (2001). Earlier in his term, Roosevelt had chosen
Crum to replace a white man as Collector of Customs in Charleston.
69
Willard B. Gatewood, Theodore Roosevelt and Southern Republicans: The Case of South
Carolina, 1901–1904, 70 S.C. HIST. MAG. 251, 263 (1969) (reporting that Roosevelt’s failure to back
Crum “would appear too much like a surrender to the blatant racism of his enemy Tillman”). Roosevelt
had roused considerable Southern anger with the appointment of Crum; in particular, Senator Tillman
“threatened social violence” if the Senate overrode his committee’s negative report on the appointment,
musing that “[w]e still have guns and ropes in the South.” MORRIS, supra note 68, at 210.
70
MORRIS, supra note 68, at 301.
71
VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33009, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: A LEGAL
OVERVIEW 8 (2011). Roosevelt had called Congress into special session the month before to acquire
approval for his Cuban reciprocity treaty. See MORRIS, supra note 68, at 272. Showing their disfavor for
Roosevelt and displaying their power, House leaders dragged on the session until the very moment
before the scheduled start of the regular session, despite having already passed the treaty. Id. at 299.
72
Special Session, supra note 10 (“The conclusion has been reached that between the time of the
falling of President pro tempore Frye’s gavel signifying the conclusion of the extraordinary session and
the calling to order of the Senate in the regular session of Congress, an appreciable lapse of time
occurred.”).
73
See Fight on Crum Renewed: Senators Attack President’s “Constructive Recess” Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1904, at 3 (detailing the Senate debate over Dr. Crum’s appointment, including charges
that Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Treasury, Leslie M. Shaw, was “guilty of malfeasance in office” and
thus indictable for installing Crum).
74
S. REP. NO. 58-4389, at 3 (1905).
75
Gatewood, supra note 69, at 262–64 (noting that the Senate finally confirmed Dr. Crum for the
office he had held for over two years in 1905; Roosevelt had to use the recess appointment several times
in the absence of confirmation).
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Roosevelt’s than Jefferson’s. In announcing a round of recess appointments
in 2010, Barack Obama blamed the Senate’s pursuit of “scoring political
points” in blocking his nominees, adding, “I simply cannot allow partisan
politics to stand in the way of the basic functioning of government.”76
George W. Bush expressed similar sentiments when he appointed John R.
Bolton ambassador to the United Nations during a Senate recess in 2005,
calling the position “too important to leave vacant any longer, especially
during a war and a vital debate about U.N. reform.”77 In other words,
presidents today still see the recess appointment power as necessary—but
the aggravating factor now is the intransigence of the Senate, not the long
trip to and from the Capitol.
Though the rationale for recess appointments has changed drastically
between the era of Washington and Jefferson and that of Bush and Obama,
the power still stands as an accepted use of presidential power. During a
recent oral argument at the Supreme Court, the conversation turned to the
Senate’s failure to reach a vote on certain presidential nominees.78 When the
Acting Solicitor General, Neal Katyal, complained that the regular advice
and consent process had been too contentious, Chief Justice John Roberts
seemed incredulous. “And the recess appointment power doesn’t work—
why?” Roberts asked,79 wondering aloud at the government’s failure to
implement the obvious solution to evade a stubborn Senate.
Roosevelt’s stratagem of using a recess appointment to install a
nominee who is particularly unfavorable to the Senate has become more or
less standard practice,80 so much so that scholars once predicted that
Congress could not or would not overcome it.81 In terms of numbers, recess
appointments are relatively infrequent, yet frequent enough to draw
scrutiny. One recent study found that 12% of presidential appointments to
independent agencies occurred during recesses of the Senate; such
appointments were far more likely when the President was popular and
76

Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to Key
Administration Positions (Mar. 27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-positions.
77
Elisabeth Bumiller & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, President Sends Bolton to U.N.; Bypasses Senate,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2005, at A1 (late edition).
78
Transcript of Oral Argument at 49–50, New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010)
(No. 08-1457). The case considered whether the NLRB could issue binding decisions with fewer than
three members. New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2638.
79
Oral Argument at 51:48, New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (No. 08-1457), available at http://
www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2009/2009_08_1457.
80
See Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on Senate Confirmations (Feb.
11, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-senateconfirmations; see also infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text (discussing the recess appointments
of George W. Bush).
81
See Michael Herz, Abandoning Recess Appointments?: A Comment on Hartnett (and Others),
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 443, 460 (2005) (arguing that congressional adoption of an innovative legislative
means to overcome recess appointments was highly unlikely and noting “these things never happen”).
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lacked partisan support in the Senate.82 Their use has accordingly varied
widely with each administration, though counts are not exact83:
TABLE 1: RECESS APPOINTMENTS FROM FDR TO OBAMA
President
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Harry S. Truman
Dwight D. Eisenhower
John F. Kennedy
Lyndon B. Johnson
Richard M. Nixon
Gerald R. Ford
James E. Carter
Ronald W. Reagan
George H.W. Bush
William J. Clinton
George W. Bush
Barack H. Obama85

Number of recess
appointments84
89
195
193
53
36
41
12
68
243
77
139
171
28

As is evident from the chart above, President Reagan was the most
prolific recess appointer in recorded American history, “shap[ing] executive
agencies in ways that would have been difficult, if not impossible” had
Reagan followed the typical nominations process.86 Such actions often drew
harsh responses. In the controversy over Reagan’s nomination of Judge
Robert Bork to the Supreme Court in October 1987, Senate Majority Leader
82

Pamela C. Corley, Avoiding Advice and Consent: Recess Appointments and Presidential Power,
36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 670, 676–78 (2006) (counting appointments between 1945 and 2000). As
Corley posits, the President is a “rational political actor”; recess appointments are easiest to make in a
political sense when the President has enough popularity to sell the appointments to the public. Id. at
672, 678. In other words, “it appears that presidents use this power sparingly and strategically, when
they think they can get away with it.” Id. at 678.
83
See Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess
Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2209 n.31 (1994) (noting the difficulties of compiling a
complete list of recess appointments, especially before 1965 when they were “recorded in a haphazard
fashion” (quoting Memorandum from Rogelio Garcia, Government Division, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Mar. 13,
1985))).
84
All figures except that of the Obama administration come from Total Recess Appointments, by
President, 1933–2010, U.S. SENATE (July 6, 2010), http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
resources/pdf/TotalRecessAppointments1933-present.pdf.
85
Kara Rowland, Two Nominees Again Face Senate, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2011, at A4 (“Mr.
Obama has made 28 recess appointments so far.”).
86
Carrier, supra note 83, at 2215.
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Robert Byrd warned that he would hold pro forma sessions to keep the
Congress in session for the rest of the year if Reagan tried to recess appoint
a Supreme Court Justice.87 Instead, Reagan proceeded to nominate Bork
through regular means, and the full Senate rejected his nomination.88 While
Senator Byrd never had to make good on his threat, his successors in the
Senate—and then the House—would do so with great effect two decades
later.
C. Evolution of the Pro Forma Session
1. Early Use.—For much of the lifespan of Congress, the pro forma
session, in the words of former Speaker of the House Jim Wright, “never
hurt anybody.”89 Its use was routine and procedural. Members of one house
of Congress would hold such a session when, for whatever reason, it did not
reach a joint agreement to adjourn with their counterparts. The practice is
required, or at least inspired, by a clause in Article I (the “Adjournments
Clause”) that forbids either house of Congress to adjourn for over three
days “without the Consent of the other.”90
For example, if the House passed an adjournment resolution before one
of Congress’s typical vacation periods but the Senate did not, then the two
bodies did not agree on the recess. As a result, the House would be obliged
to meet in pro forma session every three days during the vacation to satisfy
the Adjournments Clause.91 Such meetings were not extraordinary; Senator
Byrd characterized them as “just coming in, going out—because otherwise
we could not recess for 3 days without the approval of the other body.”92
The only other clause of the Constitution addressing the situation of
disagreement between the houses on adjournment allows the President to
“adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper.”93 However, no
president has ever invoked that authority, though they have often used the
procedural power granted by Article II to, “on extraordinary Occasions,
convene both Houses, or either of them.”94

87

See John Hanrahan, Washington News, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Oct. 7, 1987 (available at
LexisNexis) (describing Senate’s threat to hold pro forma sessions “for the remainder of the year” if
Reagan nominated a Supreme Court Justice during congressional recess).
88
Edward Walsh & Ruth Marcus, Bork Rejected for High Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1987, at
A1.
89
124 CONG. REC. 7047 (1978) (statement of Rep. Jim Wright).
90
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
91
See, e.g., 112 CONG. REC. 7843 (1966) (statement of Sen. Mike Mansfield) (describing
concurrent adjournment resolution to be passed alongside the House before Easter recess, without which
“it would be necessary for the House to meet every 3 days as prescribed in the Constitution”).
92
123 CONG. REC. 33,302 (1977).
93
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
94
Id.; THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
563 (Johnny H. Killian et al. eds., 2004).
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For some members of Congress, the promise of holding a pro forma
session in place of the next day’s regular session was a “carrot,”95 or an
incentive to quickly finish the day’s work so that most members could leave
town. Just one unlucky member of the house in question would stay behind
to conduct the pro forma session. The member’s punishment was not
severe; the sessions were often less than a minute, and sometimes so brief
as to be instantaneous.96 Sessions on Mondays and Fridays were often pro
forma, “without roll-call votes,” so that members’ “weekend fence-building
trips back home could be extended.”97
On occasion, however, pro forma sessions arose during conflict
between the two houses. In 1977, the House considered rejecting the
Senate’s recess resolution and holding pro forma sessions instead of
adjourning in order to protest the Senate’s decision to go on break without
addressing certain legislation, which left House members “dangling on the
vine.”98 In general, however, pro forma sessions occurred not out of spite,
but out of necessity, as one house for whatever reason was not able to
adjourn at the same time as the other.
2. Transformation Into Political Weapon.—Throughout the 1980s
and 1990s, senators continued to hold pro forma sessions for procedural
reasons only. They did not use them to block recess appointments during
that time, despite threats to do so.99 However, rumblings about pro forma
sessions ratcheted up during the tenure of George W. Bush100 and escalated
in 2004 after he recess appointed two federal circuit court judges.101 The
appointment of one of those judges, William Pryor of the Eleventh Circuit,
prompted a motion in a lawsuit before that court to disqualify Judge Pryor
from hearing the case. The litigant claimed that the judge’s recess

95

111 CONG. REC. 22,640 (1965) (statement of Sen. Wayne Morse) (“I have some good hopes that
we might be able to finish that bill this afternoon, and, if we can finish it this afternoon, it is my
understanding that any session that we have tomorrow will be only a pro forma session and that the
Senate will adjourn until Tuesday. That would be called a ‘carrot.’”).
96
See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 37,532 (1977) (recording a six-second session of the Senate gaveled in
and out by Sen. Lee Metcalf).
97
ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 388 (2002).
98
117 CONG. REC. 16,833 (1971) (statement of Rep. Durward G. Hall).
99
See, e.g., Marc Lacey, Gay Activist Named Envoy over Objections, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 1999, at
A1 (describing senators’ anger over President Clinton’s appointment of a gay man as ambassador to
Luxembourg and threats to block subsequent recess appointments with pro forma sessions).
100
Bush’s recess appointment of Eugene Scalia in particular set off Senate alarm bells. Paul Kane,
Senate Set for Recess Politics, ROLL CALL, Dec. 13, 2001 (available at LexisNexis) (reporting that
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle had “floated the idea that the Senate would not adjourn for recess
at all”).
101
See Paul Kane, Daschle: Recess in Peril; Judicial Appointments Again Scramble Schedule,
ROLL CALL (Feb. 25, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/49_82/-4489-1.html (reporting
Daschle’s anger over the recess appointments of Charles Pickering to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
and William Pryor to the Eleventh Circuit).
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appointment was invalid.102 And before the summer recess of 2007, Senate
Democrats came close to activating pro forma sessions in response to
President Bush’s recess appointment of Sam Fox, financial backer of a
group that criticized 2004 Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry, as
ambassador to Belgium.103
It was not until the Thanksgiving recess of 2007 that senators finally
followed through with threats to use the pro forma session to prevent all
recess appointments by President Bush.104 Angry over the breakdown of a
deal with Bush, as well as the possibility of a recess appointment of a
Surgeon General who had made potentially dubious health claims,105 Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid scheduled two weeks of pro forma sessions
during the recess.106 Senate Democrats again used the tactic over the holiday
recess into 2008,107 and in February,108 May,109 August,110 October through

102

See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The motion failed; in one of
the few judicial pronouncements on the subject, the en banc court held that Pryor’s appointment was
valid based on the history and text of the Recess Appointments Clause. Id. at 1222–27.
103
Erin P. Billings, Democrats May Block Nominees, ROLL CALL (Apr. 11, 2007, 12:00 AM),
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/52_106/-17925-1.html. The two sides reached a deal instead, in which
Bush agreed not to make recess appointments if Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid allowed some of
Bush’s nominees to reach a vote. Al Kamen, Don’t Make Me Use Article I, Section 5!, WASH. POST,
Oct. 17, 2007, at A15.
104
The associate historian of the United States Senate, Donald A. Ritchie, said in late 2007 that the
Democrats’ use of pro forma sessions at that time was the first instance of the body doing so “for the
express purpose of blocking appointments.” Peter Baker, During Recess, Democrats Push Back, WASH.
POST, Dec. 24, 2007, at A13.
105
Sean Lengell, Senate Democrats Play Recess Hardball, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, at A1
(reporting accusations that Bush’s candidate had made erroneous claims about homosexual sex).
106
Paul Kane, Senate Stays in Session to Block Recess Appointments, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2007,
at A4 (reporting Reid’s anger with Bush’s failure to nominate “Democratic selections for . . . bipartisan
commissions”).
107
See Gail Russell Chaddock, Watchdog Panel Sidelined as Elections Roll, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 9, 2008, at 1.
108
See Neil H. Simon, Virginians at the Capitol, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 2008, at
A7.
109
See Jim Abrams, Quick Senate Session Blocks Bush Appointees, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May
24, 2008, at 8A.
110
See Sean Lengell, Senate Democrats Seek to Block Bush, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at A6.
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December of 2008,111 and in January 2009.112 During these periods, Bush
chose not to make a single recess appointment.113
For some time after, the pro forma session again went dormant,
perhaps because the Democrats who had initially used it were now of the
same party as the President. President Obama made recess appointments
without incident on four separate occasions in 2010.114 But later that year,
Senate Democrats brought the pro forma session back. They struck a deal
with Republicans to hold pro forma sessions through the November
elections if the Republicans agreed not to send Obama’s nominations back
to the White House.115
A few months later, the House got involved. Fearing that President
Obama would recess appoint Elizabeth Warren to head the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau,116 House Republican leaders threatened, at the
urging of Senate Republicans,117 not to send an adjournment resolution to
the Senate, forcing Harry Reid to schedule more pro forma sessions.118

111

See Kelsey Lamb & Michael Lepage, The Week in Review, CONGRESSNOW, Nov. 21, 2008
(available at LexisNexis) (reporting pro forma sessions through Dec. 8 “to prevent President George W.
Bush from making recess appointments”); Kelsey Lamb & Michael Lepage, Two Weeks in Review,
CONGRESSNOW, Oct. 3, 2008 (available at LexisNexis) (reporting pro forma sessions through
November 17).
112
See Greg Hitt et al., Rescue Bid for Detroit Collapses in Senate, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008, at
A1 (reporting that Senate would be in pro forma session “until January, when the new Congress will be
convened with stronger Democratic majorities”).
113
HENRY B. HOGUE & MAUREEN BEARDEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42329, RECESS
APPOINTMENTS MADE BY PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA 3 (2012) (indicating Bush made no recess
appointments after the seventh year of his presidency).
114
See Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to Key
Administration Posts (Dec. 29, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/
29/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-posts; Press Release, The
White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to Key Administration Posts (Aug. 19,
2010),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/19/president-obamaannounces-recess-appointments-key-administration-posts; Press Release, The White House, President
Obama Announces Recess Appointments to Key Administration Positions (July 7, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-keyadministration-positions-0; Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Recess
Appointments to Key Administration Positions (Mar. 27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-positions.
115
See David M. Herszenhorn, A Rush to Legislate, and to Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2010, at
A16.
116
Warren was, to say the least, disliked by Republican House members as a potential leader of the
bureau. See Ylan Q. Mui, GOP Senators Vow to Block CFPB Chief, WASH. POST, May 6, 2011, at A20.
117
See Jonathan Allen, Senators Ask John Boehner to Help Block Obama Recess Appointments,
POLITICO (May 25, 2011, 7:15 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/55723.html (detailing
senators’ request to House Republican leadership for help on blocking recess appointments).
118
Kathleen Hunter, Senate Republicans Block Prospect of Warren’s Consumer Board
Appointment, BLOOMBERG (May 26, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-27/
senate-republicans-block-prospect-of-warren-s-consumer-board-appointment.html. The move brought
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Following that episode, several members of the House decided they would
cut out the middleman and simply hold pro forma sessions themselves,
pushing the Senate to do the same.119 Throughout the summer of 2011, these
congressmen gaveled in pro forma House sessions every three days;120 in
response, Obama made no recess appointments.
That is, until January 2012. Despite continuing pro forma sessions that
had been the norm during Senate breaks since 2007, President Obama made
four recess appointments on January 4.121 The appointments did not occur
on a day when the Senate was in pro forma session; one such session was
held the day before, on January 3,122 and the next happened on January 6.123
The Administration released as support for its decision a memorandum by
the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, which opined that
because the Senate had not been conducting business during its pro forma
sessions, it was effectively at recess for over a month.124
The outcry was immediate. The Speaker of the House, John Boehner,
said the appointments represented “an extraordinary and entirely
unprecedented power grab.”125 Mitch McConnell, the Senate Majority
Leader, said Obama had “threaten[ed] the confirmation process and
fundamentally endanger[ed] the Congress’s role in providing a check on the
excesses of the executive branch.”126 And one member of the House, Bill
Johnson of Ohio, threatened to sue Obama himself over the appointments.127
Was it possible the President had overstepped his authority?

on the odd sight of Democratic senators holding pro forma sessions, which had the effect of blocking the
nominees of the President of their own party.
119
Peter Schroeder, GOP Freshmen: Stop Recess Appointments by Stopping Recess, THE HILL,
June 14, 2011, at 6.
120
Stephen Dinan, GOP Prevents Recess Appointments, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2011, at A3
(reporting that House members were “holding regular sessions throughout the summer so that the Senate
also must remain in session”).
121
Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Recess Appointments to Key
Administration Posts (Jan. 4, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/
04/president-obama-announces-recess-appointments-key-administration-posts.
122
158 CONG. REC. S1 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2012).
123
Id. at S3 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2012).
124
See Lawfulness of Recess Appointments, supra note 16, at 3–4.
125
Brad Plumer, With Cordray Appointment, Obama Sets New Precedent, WASH. POST WONKBLOG
(Jan. 4, 2012, 11:22 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/with-cordrayappointment-obama-to-set-precedent/2012/01/04/gIQAJvMYaP_blog.html.
126
David Nakamura & Felicia Sonmez, Obama Defies Senate, Puts Cordray in Consumer Post,
WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1.
127
David DeWitt, GOP Rep Threatens to Sue Obama over Recess Appointment, ATHENS NEWS,
Jan. 17, 2012, at 13. Still unclear is what standing Representative Johnson would have had in such a
lawsuit.
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II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OBAMA’S 2012 RECESS APPOINTMENTS
When the dust settled and the legal academic community began to
debate the 2012 recess appointments, arguments centered on a few key
issues. The primary contention of those opposing the appointments was that
the President had taken it upon himself to decide when the Senate was at
recess, removing from the Legislative Branch the ability to make its own
rules.128 “Here, it is for the Congress to decide how to operate and govern
itself, not the president,” wrote Professor John Yoo. “If the Senate wants to
have a session where nothing happens—which, I might argue, is best for the
country in many cases—that is its prerogative.”129
Another argument held that the Senate did in fact do substantive work
between the time it recessed on December 17 and when it resumed work on
January 23.130 Senator Harry Reid, standing in a chamber with one other
senator, had asked for and received unanimous consent on the payroll tax
cut on December 23 during a supposedly pro forma session.131 Finally,
opponents argued that because the House had not ever consented to an
adjournment of more than three days, the Senate could not technically
recess without violating the Adjournments Clause132 of Article I.133
A. Realities on the Ground
As a general response to the above arguments, it is first important to
note one objective fact: the Senate was not in any kind of session, pro forma
or otherwise, on the day the President made his recess appointments. No
meeting of the Senate took place between January 3 and January 6;134 the
January 4 appointments, therefore, occurred during a three-day recess at the

128

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings . . . .”).
129
John Yoo, Cordray’s Tribe, NAT’L REV. ONLINE CORNER (Jan. 6, 2012, 5:42 PM), http://www.
nationalreview.com/corner/287439/cordrays-tribe-john-yoo.
130
See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Op-Ed., Democrats and Executive Overreach, WALL ST. J., Jan.
10, 2012, at A13 (“[T]hese sessions are not, in fact, a sham—the Senate enacted the payroll tax holiday
extension, President Obama’s leading legislative priority, on Dec. 23 during one of those pro forma
sessions . . . .”).
131
157 CONG. REC. S8789–90 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2011). Reid was able to use this unusual
maneuver to pass legislation because the Republican congressional leadership had agreed to it the day
before. See Pete Kasperowicz, Congress Approves Payroll Tax Bill, THE HILL (Dec. 23, 2011, 11:06
AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/201157-house-quickly-approves-payroll-tax-bill.
132
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting.”).
133
Edwin Meese III & Todd Gaziano, Op-Ed., Obama’s Abuse of Power, WASH. POST, Jan. 6,
2012, at A17 (arguing that the appointments violated “the duty of comity that the executive owes to
Congress”).
134
158 CONG. REC. S1 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2012) (“Under the previous order, the Senate stands
adjourned until 11 a.m. on Friday, January 6, 2012.”).
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least. They were appointments made when no Senator was around to vote
on them, not during a Senate lunch break or under cover of night.
And the recess, in reality, was much longer than three days. When the
Senate broke for vacation on December 17, 2011, its members unanimously
consented that there would be “no business conducted” until January 23,
2012.135 Standing alone, such a declaration meets the Senate’s only
officially promulgated definition of recess. In the fury over Theodore
Roosevelt’s “constructive recess” of 1903, the Senate sought to define the
term so there would be no further confusion.136 A recess of the Senate
occurs, the Senate said, “when its members owe no duty of attendance;
when its Chamber is empty; when, because of its absence, it cannot receive
communications from the President or participate as a body in making
appointments.”137 This definition has been formally included in the Senate
Parliamentarian’s manual of procedure.138 Those requirements were all met
during the pro forma sessions of 2011 and 2012; no senator was required to
attend, the chamber was empty save for a matter of seconds, and the body
as a whole certainly could not participate in making appointments.
There is, however, the fact that some business was conducted between
December 17 and January 2.139 On December 23, as noted above, Senator
Reid obtained unanimous consent from an empty chamber on the payroll
tax cut140 during an eighty-five-second session.141 Reid’s action, opponents
claim, interrupted the recess, “clearly undermining any claim that the
Senate is unavailable to perform its duties during a pro forma session.”142
Even if one accepts the argument that Reid’s motion for unanimous
consent constituted Senate business—an arguable claim143—Obama’s recess
appointments still pass muster. Reid’s motion occurred on December 23, a
full twelve days before Obama appointed Cordray and the NLRB members,
two days more than the minimum recess period appointment opponents
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157 CONG. REC. S8783–84 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011).
See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text.
137
S. REP. NO. 58-4389, at 2 (1905).
138
FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE 1084 (Alan S. Frumin
ed., rev. ed. 1992).
139
See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 130; Meese & Gaziano, supra note 133.
140
Senate Pro Forma Session, C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.c-spanvideo.
org/program/SenateProFormaSess.
141
157 CONG. REC. S8789–90 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2011).
142
158 CONG. REC. S317 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2012) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, reading into the
record a letter from thirty-four senators questioning the appointments).
143
The actual business—the agreement to the payroll tax cut extension—had been worked out
during the previous few days, not on the day in question. Further, Reid’s motion was not the passage of
legislation; it was consent that future legislation would be considered passed upon its appearance,
something the Senate was free to undo in the future. See Kasperowicz, supra note 131 (detailing the deal
between Democrats and Republicans).
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have said is necessary for a proper recess.144 Going further, as the
Administration has argued, the recess period during the new session of
Congress, from January 3 to 23, 2012, constituted a twenty-day recess,
regardless of pro forma sessions.145 Most of all, it has been standard practice
since at least 1921 for the President to determine whether a recess is
occurring,146 as the Senate sends no actual word to the White House that it is
in recess. Opponents of the appointments have failed to marshal evidence
that any Senate business occurred between Reid’s December 23 motion and
the January 4 appointments, or they have otherwise made the unprecedented
claim that twelve days is not a sufficiently lengthy recess to allow a recess
appointment. The appointments should stand on their own.
B. Three Days or Less?
But even if the pragmatic arguments above were not true, and the 2012
appointments occurred during what was merely a three-day recess of the
Senate,147 the appointments remain constitutionally legitimate. While three
days is shorter than most recesses during which presidents have made
appointments,148 presidential action to make appointments during a recess of
that length is not unprecedented. Moreover, the rationale behind the
argument that a recess must be three days long to validate a recess
appointment fails under close examination.
In addition to Theodore Roosevelt’s “constructive recess,” lasting only
moments,149 President Harry Truman made an appointment during a
similarly limited window early in his presidency.150 During a three-day
break between December 31, 1948, and January 3, 1949, Truman reappointed Oswald Ryan, a prominent member of the Civil Aeronautics
Board,151 to his post without the consent of Congress. (The appointment
stood.)152
144

See Carrie Johnson, Debate over Appointees Hinges On One Word: Recess, NPR (Jan. 7, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/07/144812953/debate-over-appointees-hinges-on-one-word-recess (quoting
Heritage Foundation official Todd Gaziano: “There have been over 90 years of interpretation in which
both branches of government have agreed that [a break of] at least nine or 10 days [with no Senate
business conducted] is necessary . . . .” (alterations in original)).
145
Lawfulness of Recess Appointments, supra note 16, at 1.
146
Executive Power—Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 25 (1921) (“[T]he President is
necessarily vested with a large, although not unlimited, discretion to determine when there is a real and
genuine recess making it impossible for him to receive the advice and consent of the Senate.”).
147
The January 3 session ended at 12:02 and 13 seconds PM; the January 6 session began at 11:00
and 3 seconds AM.
148
HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21308, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 10 (2012) (pointing to shortest recess length of at least ten days).
149
See supra Part I.B.2.
150
HOGUE, supra note 148, at 10.
151
William G. Blair, Oswald Ryan, 94, Once Headed C.A.B., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1983, at 24.
152
HOGUE, supra note 148, at 10.
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While two episodes do not make a trend, they suggest that there is no
ironclad constitutional or historical reason a recess must be three days long
before a president can consider recess appointments. As the only federal
appellate court to touch this question in recent years has found, the
Constitution “does not establish a minimum time that an authorized break in
the Senate must last to give legal force to the President’s appointment
power under the Recess Appointments Clause.”153 It would be difficult to
argue from a plain reading of the Constitution’s text, combined with
historical experience, that Obama’s appointments during a three-day recess
were either unprecedented or blatantly in violation of the separation of
powers.
Opponents of the appointments nonetheless claim constitutional
support for the idea that a recess appointment can occur only during a
recess of more than three days. For this idea, they point to the
Adjournments Clause, requiring either house of Congress to acquire
consent from the other if its members want to adjourn for over three days.154
Therefore, they submit, a recess must be three days to be constitutionally
valid and thus appropriate for recess appointments. The sole authority155
beyond the op-ed page for this notion rests in the tentative wording of a
Department of Justice amicus brief from 1993. In Mackie v. Clinton, a
federal district court heard a claim on an appointment made during a
thirteen-day recess of the Senate.156 Though the decision turned on other
matters, the Justice Department filed a twenty-eight page “memorandum of
points and authorities” in the case that included four paragraphs discussing
recess lengths.157
After citing the Adjournments Clause, the brief begins and ends its
substantive argument on the topic with two sentences: “It might be argued
that this [constitutional language] means that the Framers did not consider
one, two and three day recesses to be constitutionally significant. But that
situation is not presented here because the recess lasted 13 days.”158 This
assertion is accompanied by no support, historical or otherwise. In addition,
the brief states, any other argument for the baseline length of a recess in
reference to the Recess Appointments Clause “would of necessity be

153

Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
See, e.g., Meese & Gaziano, supra note 133.
155
MAEVE P. CAREY & HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41776, PRESIDENTIAL
APPOINTMENTS TO FULL-TIME POSITIONS IN INDEPENDENT AND OTHER AGENCIES DURING THE 110TH
CONGRESS 6 n.25 (2011) (noting that the “three-day norm” cited as justification for pro forma sessions
“derives from” a brief in the Mackie case).
156
827 F. Supp. 56, 57 (D.D.C. 1993).
157
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 25, Mackie, 827 F. Supp. 56 (No. 93-0032-LFO).
158
Id.
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completely arbitrary” because “the Constitution provides no basis for
limiting the recess to a specific number of days.”159
The assertion in the memo that three days might have been
“constitutionally significant” to the Framers is belied by two historical
facts. First, the initial text of the Adjournments Clause during the
Constitutional Convention appeared in a draft constitution submitted by
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina on May 29, 1787.160 Yet that document
did not specify three days, or any number of days at all: “Neither House,
without the consent of the other, shall adjourn for more than —— days, nor
to any place but where they are sitting.”161 It strains credulity to claim that a
three-day period is somehow a natural fit for the Constitution, as the
number was initially left indeterminate.
Second, there is no record of any debate in Madison’s journal of the
Convention over what number of days to require in the Clause. Its next
mention at the Convention was more than two months after Pinckney
introduced his plan, when the “three days” language suddenly appeared in a
new draft of the Constitution.162 Madison’s journal reveals no debate on the
Clause between those two dates, and nothing that would shed light on the
Framers’ choice of three days for the timing of adjournments. Finally, the
three-day requirement has not proven to be ironclad. In 1916, to pick just
one example, the Senate adjourned from a Saturday to a Thursday without
the House’s consent;163 the lapse “was called to the attention of the House
membership but nothing further was ever done about it.”164 That was not the
only instance. As Senator Byrd noted in 1977, “precedent” reveals that the
Senate has often recessed without pro forma sessions, despite not receiving
the House’s permission: “The Senate has, in the past, gone out from
Wednesday until Monday without the approval of the other body.”165
There are few logical or constitutional reasons why the Framers would
have placed a special importance on the number three. Nor, for that matter,
is there any constitutional reason why the Recess Appointments Clause be
considered in light of the Adjournments Clause. Three days is longer than a
weekend, perhaps, but shorter than a work week, and there is little else but
conjecture to guide the question. It was not mentioned in the debates of the
Convention, nor in The Federalist. Even Justice Story, who seemed able to
articulate the logic behind the entire Constitution, gave no explanation for
the figure in his Commentaries, despite mentioning the Clause.166
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id. at 26.
MADISON, supra note 45, at 64–72 (debate of May 29, 1787).
Id. at 67.
Id. at 452 (debate of Aug. 6, 1787).
53 CONG. REC. 8853 (daily ed. May 29, 1916).
RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 138, at 15.
123 CONG. REC. 33,302 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1977).
2 STORY, supra note 49, § 841, at 303–04.
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What is more, Article II gives the President a special power to adjourn
the houses of Congress “in Case of Disagreement between them, with
Respect to the Time of Adjournment.”167 The Clause mentions no minimum
time during which the houses must disagree before the President can step
in. As noted above, no president has ever used this power.168 But its
inclusion nonetheless suggests that the three-day requirement for
“constitutionally significant” recesses is far from ironclad. And it further
justifies the notion that the President does have some right to interact with
Congress over its adjournment—at the very least when Congress is actually
at recess but claims not to be.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRO FORMA SESSION
A. Deactivation of an Enumerated Power
Through use of the pro forma session in recent years, Congress has
blockaded presidential use of a power enumerated in Article II of the
Constitution. That article confers upon the President the “Power to fill up
all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate.”169 Yet
Congress has used the pro forma session as a vehicle to claim that recesses
no longer occur, making the Recess Appointments Clause into surplusage.
However, the Senate is not in session when it sends one senator for a “pro
forma” meeting of the body. Even if it were, holding these “meetings” once
every three days does not render the body continuously in session.170 It is in
recess. By claiming otherwise, the Senate’s arguments risk violating the
letter of the Constitution and the intent of its Framers. In defying the
Senate’s interpretation and making his appointments, President Obama
stood on solid ground.
It is a simple canon of constitutional interpretation that nothing in the
Constitution should be construed to be “entirely without meaning.”171 “It
cannot be presumed that any clause in the [C]onstitution is intended to be
without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the
words require it.”172 Any construction of a provision of the Constitution that
renders it “mere surplusage, [or] form without substance . . . cannot,
therefore, be the true construction of the article.”173 And yet, the Recess
Appointment Clause was destined to remain mere surplusage without the
appointments of January 2012. Since 2007, first George W. Bush and then
167

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 94, at 563.
169
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
170
See supra Part II.A–B.
171
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
172
Id.
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Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 394 (1821) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at
174) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Barack Obama had acquiesced to the Senate’s interpretation, refraining
from making appointments during recess when pro forma sessions were
ongoing.174
Article II, unlike the laundry list of congressional powers in Article I,
affords the Executive only a few enumerated powers. The section names
just six separate prerogatives of the President, a list short enough to be
repeated here: to serve as Commander in Chief; to require opinions from
the heads of executive departments; to grant reprieves and pardons; to make
treaties; to make appointments; and to make recess appointments.175
The power of the President to make appointments is enumerated within
a single clause of the Constitution, but it is admittedly tempered within that
same clause by the involvement of the Senate. The extent of the Senate’s
involvement in the appointments process is articulated in three words:
“Advice and Consent.”176 Though the meaning of that phrase “is not selfevident,”177 the understanding among the Framers eventually settled upon
the notion that “as the President was to nominate, there would be
responsibility; and as the Senate was to concur, there would be
security”178—in other words, the definition of shared governance and
separation of powers.
Yet there is no such mention of the Senate in the subsequent clause on
recess appointments. The Framers excluded involvement of senators in
recess appointments because—and this almost goes without saying—they
would not be in town when such appointments were needed. Yet today,
when the Senate holds pro forma sessions, it is also not sitting as a
deliberative body, despite claiming to be one. Ninety-nine senators have
gone home to perform vital constituent services.179 One senator stands
before an empty chamber;180 orders of procedure explicitly command that
no business is to be conducted.181 The great majority of senators are away,
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See supra Part I.C.2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Curiously, Section Two also enumerates a power of Congress, in that it
“may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” Id. cl. 2. For an exploration of that Clause,
see Hanah Metchis Volokh, Note, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for Federal
Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2008).
176
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
177
Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and Consent”: A Historical
and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 108 (2005).
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MADISON, supra note 45, at 681 (quoting Gouverneur Morris) (debate of Sept. 7, 1787).
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See infra notes 226–30 and accompanying text.
180
See, e.g., Lengell, supra note 105 (describing a twenty-two second Senate session with one
senator where no business was conducted).
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See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S1085 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2008) (including multiple statements of Sen.
Harry Reid that “the Senate [will] meet in pro forma session only with no business conducted” on
several upcoming days).
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but through a construction of the word “recess,” they are squelching an
enumerated power designed to operate when they are in absentia.
As Chief Justice Roberts observed recently in another context, “The
Constitution’s express conferral of some powers makes clear that it does not
grant others.”182 It is a simple point, but the Constitution does not grant the
Senate the power to block recess appointments by pretending not to be at
recess. The Bush–Obama-era pro forma sessions allowed Congress to
nullify an enumerated Article II power of the President and were therefore
contrary to the Constitution.
B. The House’s Involvement
The most recent pro forma sessions of the House aimed squarely at
recess appointments represented a more blatant affront to the Constitution.
The House of Representatives is excluded entirely from the Appointments
Clause and has no role to play in presidential appointments. The Framers of
the Constitution had sensible reasons for making such an exclusion.183 Yet,
as of 2011, Republican members of the House, who held the majority, were
holding pro forma sessions explicitly to block presidential appointments.184
These actions unconstitutionally usurped the Senate’s appointment power
and violated the intent of the Framers to leave the House out of
appointments.
By themselves, the House’s pro forma sessions—when used for
procedural reasons only—represent valid practice.185 But in 2011, House
members held pro forma sessions with the explicit and exclusive intent to
obstruct presidential nominations. As eighty House members wrote to their
leadership in 2011, “[t]he next logical step in our efforts to restore the
public’s trust in their government is to prevent further recess appointments”
and ensure that “the House of Representatives will meet no less than once
every three days for the remainder of 2011 and all of 2012.”186 Several
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Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Roberts also pointed out that “[l]egislative novelty is not necessarily fatal; there is a first
time for everything. But sometimes ‘the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional
problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent’ for Congress’s action.” Id. at 2586 (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct.
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104.
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See infra notes 188–98 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
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Letter from Eighty Members of the House of Representatives to John Boehner, Eric Cantor, and
Kevin McCarthy, U.S. House Representatives (June 15, 2011), http://landry.house.gov/sites/landry.
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House members, with the consent of their majority leaders, acted on that
proposal.187
This House involvement in appointments would likely have come as
something of a surprise to the Framers. When Hamilton addressed a
potential “scheme” to include the House of Representatives along with the
Senate in the “business of appointments,”188 he did not dismiss it out of
hand, but he came close:
A body so fluctuating, and at the same time so numerous, can never be deemed
proper for the exercise of that power. Its unfitness will appear manifest to all,
when it is recollected that in half a century it may consist of three or four
hundred persons. All the advantages of the stability, both of the executive and
of the senate, would be defeated by this union; and infinite delays and
embarrassments would be occasioned.189

While debate over the Constitution produced several different
proposals for the appointments process, including sole Senate authority for
appointing Supreme Court Justices and ambassadors,190 the House did not
feature in the negotiations. The first proposal for the appointment of judges
assigned the task to the “National Legislature,”191 but James Wilson and
others feared that the “impropriety of such appointments by numerous
bodies” necessarily included “[i]ntrigue, partiality, and concealment.”192 In
response, the Framers struck a compromise representing the shared power
that landed the nomination power with the Executive.193
Concerns about the size of the House came at a time when it had just
sixty-five members to the Senate’s twenty-six,194 half the proportional
advantage the House holds today. While Hamilton’s fear of “pervasive
politicization and instability” through involving the House in
appointments195 has also more or less infected the modern Senate, the
original design of unelected senators was implemented to avoid such
problems. The Framers wanted “persons of more experience, weight of
187

See Jordy Yager, Meet the Eight Freshmen Keeping Congress in Session This Summer, THE
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 51, at 515, 519 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Id. at 519.
190
MADISON, supra note 45, at 455 (reprinting a draft of the Constitution produced by the
Committee of Detail, with Senate appointment powers contained in § 1 of “Article IX”).
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Id. at 108 (debate of June 5, 1787).
192
Id.
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White, supra note 177, at 129.
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1033, 1059 (2008) (reviewing BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT
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character, and talents, than the members of the House.”196 The appointments
process remains entrusted to the Executive and the Senate, “the two elective
branches of the federal government least susceptible to majoritarian
pressures.”197 In the House, the bar to gaining office is lower,198 terms are
shorter, and its members are thus more vulnerable to ouster than those in
the Senate and Executive Branch. While there have been inventive
proposals199 for involving the House in advice and consent, such proposals
would nonetheless likely require a constitutional amendment,200 which at
this point does not appear to be forthcoming.
But these points do not require exhaustive analysis here. Whether
implemented for valid reasons or not, the Appointments Clause excludes
the House.201 Because the recess appointment power “is to be considered as
supplementary to the one which precedes,”202 i.e., the appointment power,
there is no question that it, too, excludes the House. In holding pro forma
sessions to block recess appointments, House members did not incur
punishment or court challenges, but perhaps they should have. They plainly
inserted the House of Representatives into the appointments process—
lending President Obama’s 2012 recess appointments during pro forma
sessions even more constitutional credibility.
C. The Recess as Constitutional Assumption
As a final matter, it is worthwhile to note that recesses of Congress are
referenced in the United States Constitution but not created by it. Unlike
specifically promulgated notions such as the compensation203 and the
required number of annual meetings204 of Congress, the recess of Congress
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2 STORY, supra note 49, § 1516, at 344.
Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury and the Historical Origins of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 1060 (2007).
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is only mentioned once in passing: in reference to the grant of authority to
the President in the Recess Appointments Clause.205
As this section will explain, the inclusion of the recess in the
Constitution resulted from a simple assumption of the Framers: that
recesses were a necessary component of legislative procedure. They
included an appointment power based on the presence of recesses because
they assumed legislative recesses would always exist, as they had for
millennia. Yet through its targeted pro forma sessions, Congress attempted
to eliminate the recess. That attempt defied an original procedural
assumption of the Framers—that recesses will exist—which arguably
underlies the Constitution and should not be contravened. Further,
Congress’s attempt to eliminate the recess is proven illegitimate by the fact
that recesses still occur during pro forma sessions in everything but name.
There are several oblique references to procedural mechanisms and
entities in the Constitution that the document does not explicitly call for.
One example is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who is required to
preside over the impeachment trial of the President.206 That is the sole
mention of the office of Chief Justice in the document; the office is never
explicitly created,207 and provisions for salary and tenure of federal judges
in Article III otherwise make no “special reference to the chief.”208
Likewise, other institutions and procedures are mentioned in passing as
though their existence was assumed at the Framing, such as the Treasury,209
state legislatures,210 orders and resolutions of Congress,211 and militias.212
The Framers’ assumptions about procedural mechanisms such as recesses
are distinct from the Framers’ possible substantive assumptions about rights
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Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
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Session.”).
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The role was established by statute in the 1789 Judiciary Act. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1,
1 Stat. 73, 73.
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E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“The Senators and Representatives shall receive a
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and privileges, which are less certain and arguably not binding.213 Instead,
these assumptions refer to things that in large part already existed or were
part of the common practice of the time.214 Such procedures should be
governed strictly by the Framers’ assumptions; they represent the Framers’
critical thoughts about how government should be structured and therefore
must be maintained.
Admittedly, the recess appointment power is a conditional grant of
authority to the President. The power is active only “during the Recess of
the Senate.”215 But the Framers assumed the condition necessary for
exercise of that power would exist; many of them had taken recesses
themselves as legislators under the Articles of Confederation.216 They were
also no doubt aware of the historical procedural practices of legislatures that
served as their models, which took recesses as a matter of course.217 Just as
important, the state legislatures from which many of the Framers arose also
regularly took recesses,218 an experience that helped inspire Jefferson’s idea
for a Committee of the States to act during congressional intermissions.219
Both Parliament and the Congress of the Confederation had assigned
powers away for the inevitable consequence that recesses would occur.220
The recess appointment power in Article II was no different, and the
Framers no doubt assumed it would always be accessible, just as they
assumed recesses would always take place.
One response to this argument is that simply because the Framers
assumed the existence of recesses does not mean they must still occur. And
it is certainly true that the recess of the Senate is no longer strictly
213

See Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 616 (2009) (discussing the range of possible substantive assumptions of the
Framers and criticizing the treatment of such assumptions as binding, as in contract law).
214
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a common treasury.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VIII. The militia assuredly existed
throughout the colonies prior to the 1787 Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., MUSTER ROLLS OF THE
NAVY AND LINE, MILITIA AND RANGERS, 1775–1783, at 399–809 (William Henry Egle ed., Pa., Wm.
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necessary. Senators are among the most frequent fliers221 and train
passengers222 in our country; barring incompetency in our common carriers,
enough of them can make it to Washington to perform Senate business at
any given time. Yet the Framers’ recognition that Senate recesses were
necessary—that the body could not be “continually in session”223—was as
valid then as it is today. Even with modern pro forma sessions, during
which the Senate is “active,” senators still perform the same traditional
recess activities that their predecessors did. In other words, they are at
recess, but calling it something else.
During the Senate’s 2011–2012 winter break, for example, which
lasted from December 17224 to January 23,225 its members were busy outside
Washington. They went on diplomatic missions,226 toured businesses in
their home states,227 spoke to local Boys and Girls Clubs,228 and met with
their constituents229—an exchange one of them deemed “so important to the
process of representative government.”230 These senators would likely be
the first to admit that such activities are necessary to their effectiveness as
representatives. Yet they are the same senators who claimed their chamber
was fully active during pro forma sessions. Without recesses, senators could
not exit Washington en masse to perform vital constituent services.
221

See, e.g., Rhonda Schwartz, Reid, Lott Top Senate List of Corporate Frequent Fliers, ABCNEWS
(Jan. 8, 2007, 5:23 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2007/01/reid_lott_top_s.
222
See, e.g., Mark Leibovich, Riding the Rails with Amtrak Joe, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS (Sept. 16,
2008, 5:51 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/riding-the-rails-with-amtrak-joe
(detailing the train-based exploits of then-Senator Joe Biden, an Amtrak aficionado).
223
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
224
157 CONG. REC. S8783–84 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011) (unanimous consent given to Senator Ron
Wyden’s request that “when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn and convene for pro
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225
158 CONG. REC. S13 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2012) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid: “I, first of all,
welcome everyone back after the long break we had. I hope it was restful and productive for
everyone.”).
226
Press Release, Office of Sen. Mitch McConnell, McConnell to Visit Burma (Jan. 12, 2012),
available at http://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases (browse by month and
year to January 2012; then select Jan. 12, 2012 press release).
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Press Release, Office of Sen. Marco Rubio, Senator Marco Rubio to Visit Orlando Wednesday
(Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news?p=Press-Releases
(browse by month and year to January 2012; then select Jan. 10, 2012 press release).
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As it stands, senatorial opponents of pro forma session recess
appointments have tried to have it both ways. They pretended recesses were
not occurring despite traveling home for recess duties, yet still tried to
scuttle an enumerated recess power the Framers assumed would always be
available. In the process, they defied a constitutional assumption of the
Framers, who wrote the practice of recess appointments into the
Constitution itself based on history, logic, and good sense.
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS
The appointments process and the recess appointments process have
changed drastically since the time of the Framers. As originally conceived,
the interplay of advice and consent with presidential nominations was
uncontroversial. From 1789 until 1961, for example, the Senate rejected
only eight presidential nominees to cabinet positions,231 reflecting the “usual
custom of the Senate”232 not to interfere with the President’s choices for
who would lead departments of the Executive Branch. Yet with the passage
of time, the ever-increasing use of “dilatory tactics” in the Senate has
produced “a highly politicized process of confirming executive branch
nominations.”233 This is not a new story. President Obama’s complaint in
2010, for example, about the Senate’s “unprecedented obstruction”234 of his
nominees was itself hardly unprecedented.235
As the appointments process has evolved, so has the recess
appointment power. The recess appointment today is just as exemplary of
partisan conflict as the normal appointments process.236 The original reasons
behind such a power—much shorter sessions of Congress and the realities
of eighteenth century travel—no longer apply. Yet both appointment
provisions have evolved to complement each other as a new form of checks
and balances. Through the use of such “dilatory” measures, the Senate has
achieved a nearly unfettered ability to frustrate typical nominations, and the
recess appointment power has likewise evolved to allow the Executive the
ability to combat such obstruction.
231
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& Jeff Sessions 1 (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.politico.com/static/PPM153_cc_093010.
html.
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See, e.g., Brian Naylor, Bipartisan Group Pursuing Compromise on Filibuster, NPR (May 20,
2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4659790 (quoting Sen. Mitch McConnell
on the Democrats’ “unprecedented obstruction” of President Bush’s nominees).
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However, when the Senate denies the President the recess appointment
power through its use of pro forma sessions, it upsets this balance. Senate
success at derailing nominations, including recess nominations, is not only
damaging, it is self-defeating. The reason is clear: Senate obstruction often
fails to block the nominees it targets. Were the recess appointment power
instead allowed to function,237 it could resume its important role as both a
check and a balance in the appointment of government officers.
A. The Problem of Unfilled Offices
Congressional obstruction of presidential appointments has costs that
are practical as well as constitutional. In general, over the past several
administrations, vacancies have caused “agency inaction, confusion among
nonpolitical workers, and decreased agency accountability.”238 The
predicament may be most acute in the judiciary, where vacancies are
pushing the system toward a “crisis point” of too many cases and too few
judges.239 In 2011, 101 of the nation’s 857 federal judgeships (excluding the
Supreme Court) were empty, with the Administrative Office of the Courts
calling 46 of those vacancies “judicial emergenc[ies]” where judges cannot
keep up with caseloads.240
The problem is directly linked to the Senate’s obstruction of
presidential nominees. In his annual report on the federal judiciary in 2010,
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that “[e]ach political party has found it easy to
turn on a dime from decrying to defending the blocking of judicial
nominations, depending on their changing political fortunes. This has
created acute difficulties for some judicial districts. Sitting judges in those
districts have been burdened with extraordinary caseloads.”241 The crisis has
grown to the point where the Justice Department estimates that by 2020,
half of all judgeships will be unfilled if the current pattern continues.242
Litigants will wait even longer for their day in federal court, and those with
exclusively federal claims, such as those in the ever-booming patent
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litigation market,243 will be the most affected because they have no choice
but federal court from the outset. The potential impact of this situation is
ominous. As Justice Kennedy has noted, “If judicial excellence is cast upon
a sea of congressional indifference, the rule of law is imperiled.”244
The dilemma is far from limited to the judiciary appointments. For
example, the Senate’s decision in 2007 to block all recess appointments
with pro forma sessions produced governmental difficulties and had “farreaching policy consequences.”245 Among these consequences was the
inability of the Federal Elections Commission to make major campaign
finance decisions a year before heated midterm elections; another was the
discrediting of the National Labor Relations Board,246 which was operating
with two of five members, a situation the Supreme Court later held to be
unacceptable.247 The current Administration’s decision to alter this balance
and restore the President’s ability to make these entities functional was not
only constitutional, but a step in the right direction for the effective
functioning of American government.
B. The Problem of Acting Heads
Not all offices, however, have remained unfilled during the era of pro
forma obstruction. While members of Congress may believe they are
preventing the appointment of individuals who will make unwelcome
policy choices, refusing a recess appointment often does not freeze an
agency or prevent it from acting. On the contrary, many agencies continue
to operate under the direction of a person Congress has never confirmed:
the acting head, or the person who fills the office before the Senate
approves the official head.
Federal law permits the President to appoint an individual “to perform
the functions and duties of [a] vacant [federal] office temporarily in an
acting capacity.”248 In allowing this power, Congress “wanted to diminish
the length of vacancies by temporarily filling such offices with subordinates
while the President nominated a permanent replacement to the Senate.”249
Congress provided for such vacancies through the Vacancies Act of 1868
243
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and subsequent amendments; the most recent version allows for acting
heads to remain in office for up to 210 days.250 Therefore, while Congress
regularly held pro forma sessions to block recess appointments since 2007,
it was doing nothing to prevent the accession of acting heads who
proceeded to make policy decisions without any congressional oversight
whatsoever.
A particularly acute example is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF). While President Obama’s 2010 nominee
for ATF director has been waiting over two years251 for Senate confirmation
at this writing, presidents have appointed multiple acting directors to head
the $1 billion, 2,500-agent agency,252 all without any Senate input. In fact,
ATF has been without a confirmed director since Senate confirmation was
first required253 for the agency in 2006, with five acting directors since
then.254 These acting heads have not hesitated to make policy255 and
personnel choices256 since that time, despite the lack of any Senateconfirmed director. Some of these policy choices, such as the notorious Fast
and Furious program which inadvertently put guns in the hands of drug
cartels, have sparked controversy.257 Consequently, it might be argued that
policymaking at ATF has been removed from the advice and consent
regime altogether, despite the law requiring the Senate to confirm the
agency’s directors.
Other offices serving important roles in government have also been
home to acting heads. For example, the Obama Administration’s
250
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Comptroller of the Currency, a Treasury Department office whose charge is
to “charter, regulate, and supervise all national banks and federal savings
associations,”258 was home to an acting head for nearly two years.259 This
unconfirmed director had an indisputable effect on policy after taking
office; Senate Democrats demanded his removal for “obstructing key
aspects” of the Administration’s financial overhaul plan.260 Senators’
holding out on recess appointments did not change the fact that officers
unaccountable to the Senate were running those agencies.
Moreover, in several instances the acting head of an agency was the
very same person whose recess appointment Congress was attempting to
prevent—rendering the use of the pro forma session to block that
appointment all the more fruitless. For example, the Obama Administration
in June 2011 nominated Martin J. Gruenberg to serve as chairman for the
Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).261
But despite the fact that the Senate had not yet confirmed his appointment
as of November 2011, Gruenberg had been serving since his nomination as
acting chairman.262 At the National Labor Relations Board, already a
contentious battleground in this area after Obama’s January 2012 recess
appointments to its board,263 the President’s current nominee for general
counsel264 and the current acting general counsel265 are one and the same.
These acting heads implement policy just as an officially confirmed
officeholder would, especially if the nominee and the acting head are the
same person. Were the House and Senate to allow recess appointments of
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these individuals, as it may have done with Obama’s 2012 appointees,266 the
effect would be the same. In such an event, the constitutional problem of
such sessions could be avoided, and the recess appointments would expire
“at the End of their next Session,”267 allowing the Senate a new chance to
evaluate a new nominee.
CONCLUSION
Although members of the House and Senate purported to honor the
Constitution by blocking presidential recess appointments with pro forma
sessions for years, this Comment contends that they were instead violating
it. Despite congressional backlash against President Obama’s decision in
early 2012 to break the logjam these sessions created, an analysis of the
timing of the appointments indicates that the President was on solid policy
and constitutional ground. Further, even if the timing of Obama’s
appointments was questionable, the pro forma sessions that otherwise
restrained him from acting to fill vital offices did not reflect sound
constitutional policy. Not only did the sessions effectively erase an
enumerated executive power from Article II, they did so in a way that
perpetuated an unsafe glut of unfilled government offices. When courts take
up the question of whether the 2012 appointments were appropriate, they
should take care to recognize that the recess appointment remains a vital
part of the hamstrung advice and consent process. It should be left in place
as an effective but limited tool of government.
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